Abstract: As Part 2 of the paper "on networked evolutionary games", this paper uses the framework presented in Part 1 (Qi et al., 2014) to explore further issues about networked evolutionary games (NEGs). First, the strategy profile dynamics (SPD) is constructed from the fundamental evolutionary equations (FEEs). Using SPD, the control of NEGs are investigated. Detailed mathematical models are obtained for both deterministic and dynamic cases respectively. Then certain more complicated NEGs are explored. They are: (i) NEG with strategies of different length information, which allows some players use longer history information such as the information at t and t − 1 or so; (ii) NEG with Multi-Species, which allows an NEG with various kinds of players, they play several different fundamental network games according to their identities. (iii) NEG with time-varying payoffs. Since payoffs determine the evolution, the network profile dynamics will be a time-varying one. These more complicated NEGs can cover more general evolutions and they generalized the method proposed in Cheng et al. (Preprint2013) .
INTRODUCTION
In Part 1 of this paper an NEG is defined as following, which was firstly proposed in Cheng et al. (Preprint2013) . Definition 1. An NEG, game, denoted by ((N, E), G, Π), consists of three ingredients as: (i) a network (graph) (N, E); (ii) a fundamental network game (FNG), G, such that if (i, j) ∈ E, then i and j play the FNG with strategies x i (t) and x j (t) respectively. (iii) a local information based strategy updating rule (SUR).
It was proved that the fundamental evolutionary equation (FEE) for each player can be obtained as x i (t + 1) = f i ({x k (t)|k ∈ U 2 (i)}) , i = 1, · · · , n.
(1) Then the network profile dynamics is uniquely determined by FEEs.
We refer to Qi et al. (2014) and Cheng et al. (Preprint2013) for details.
Part 2 of the paper considers several advanced problems about NEGs. In Section 2 the SPD is constructed from FEEs. Using SPD, the control problems of NEGs are This work was supported in part by National Natural Science Foundation (NNSF) of China under Grants 61074114, 61273013, and 61333001. investigated. A detailed mathematical framework is presented in Section 3 as a standard k-valued logical control networks. Then all the techniques for the control of kvalued logical networks can be used. Section 4 considers the NEGs where players can use different length of historical information to update their strategies. In Section 5 we consider the NEGs with multi-species. That is, the players are classified into several species, and players of different species play different roles in the networked games. Section 6 considers when the fundamental network game has timevarying payoff functions. Section 7 is a brief conclusion.
FROM FEE TO NPD
The NPD is used to describe the evolution of the overall networked games. This section consider how to construct the NPD of an NEG using its nodes' FEEs. We consider two cases: (i) the FEEs are deterministic model; (ii) the FEEs are probabilistic model.
Deterministic Model
. .
where
and M i ∈ L k×k n . Then we have the NPD as
Example 2. Recall Example 12 of Part 1. We have
Finally, we have the NPD as
where , 20, 8, 24, 15, 32, 16, 32, 29, 32, 32, 32, 31, 32, 32, 32 26, 28, 32, 32, 32, 32, 32, 32, 30, 32, 32, 32, 32, 32, 32, 32] .
Probabilistic Model
Assume the strategies have the probabilistic k-valued logical form as
Then we have
where M ∈ Υ k n ×k n can be calculated as
We use an example to depict it. Example 3. Recall Example 13 of Part 1. In fact, we can use Table 5 there to calculate M row by row. For instance, it is obvious that 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0] T .
We simply express it as [1, 1, 1, α, 1, α, β, γ, µ, λ, 11, 32, λ, 32, 32, 32 1, 1, 1, α, 1, 22, α, p, µ, q, r, 32, s, 32, 32, 32] , 
MODELING CONTROLLED NEGS
Definition 4. Let ( (N, E) , G, Π) be an NEG, and N = U ∪ Z be a partition of N . We call ((U ∪ Z), E), G, Π) a controlled NEG, if the strategies of u ∈ U can be chosen arbitrarily. As a result, z ∈ Z is called a state and u ∈ U is called a control.
Using FEE, the strategy evolutionary equations can be expressed as (Cheng et al., Preprint2013) x
We consider the deterministic case and the probabilistic case separately.
(
The notationx s means this factor is removed.
Define
then we have
The controlled network profile evolutionary equation is expressed as z(t + 1) = Ψu(t)z(t).
(15) This is a standard k-valued logical control network.
(2) (Probabilistic Case) Assume
Then for each choice:
using the technique developed for deterministic case. Finally we have (15) again with
Note that a general procedure is provided above. But for a particular NEG, the process may be simplified. We use some examples to depict this. Example 5. Recall Example 12 in Part 1. Assume players 2 and 4 are controls and the others are states. That is,
. Similarly, we can have
, 2, 2, 2, 2, 2, 1, 2, 1, 2, 2, 2, 2, 2, 2, 2, 2, 2, 2, 2, 2, 2, 2, 2, 2, 2, 2, 2, 2, 2];
, 2, 1, 1, 2, 2, 2, 2, 2, 2, 2, 2, 2, 2, 2, 2, 2, 2, 2, 2, 2, 2, 2, 2, 2, 2, 2, 2, 2, 2];
= δ 2 [1, 2, 1, 2, 2, 2, 2, 2, 2, 2, 2, 2, 2, 2, 2, 2, 1, 2, 1, 2, 2, 2, 2, 2, 2, 2, 2, 2, 2, 2, 2, 2]. Finally, we have controlled NEG as , 6, 3, 8, 6, 6, 8, 8, 4, 8, 4, 8, 8, 8, 8, 8, 7, 8, 7, 8, 8, 8, 8, 8, 8, 8, 8, 8, 8, 8, 8, 8] . Example 6. Recall Example 13 in Part 1. Assume players 3 and 4 are controls and the others are states. That is, Finally, we have the networked profile evolutionary equation as
where L can be calculated by using the technique proposed in Example 17 in Part 1 (Qi et al., 2014) as N, E) , G, Π).
(i) A player, say, i, is said to use length-r (historic) information, if
where = max{0, t − r + 1}. (ii) The NEG is said to have strategies of different length (historic) information, if there is a partition
such that a player j ∈ N r implies that j is with r-length information.
Now assume i uses length-r information and let t ≥ r − 1. Then we have
Note that in the above equation the f i in the first equality is different from the f i in the second equation. To avoid notational complexity, we use the same notation. Now for each j we define
Using this set of new variables, we can express (22) into a normal form as
Then the technique developed in Part 1 for standard NEGs is applicable for this case. Finally, we consider the initial values. We consider {x i (0), · · · , x i (r − 1) i = 1, · · · , n} as the initial values. In fact, only {x i (0) i = 1, · · · , n} are real initial values. Then we can use the following equation
and the method similar to (23)- (25) to calculate all other initial values.
To calculate the network profile dynamics of this kind of networks, we need the following lemma (Cheng et al., Preprint2013) Lemma 8. Assume X ∈ ∆ p and Y ∈ ∆ q . We define two dummy matrices, named by "front-maintaining operator" (FMO) and "rear-maintaining operator"(RMO) respectively, as:
Then we have D
We give an example to depict this. Example 9. Consider an NEG ((N, E), G, Π), where the graph is a cycle of n = 6 nodes, and the FNG is the same as in Example 12 of Part 1. Assume players 2, 3, 4, 5, 6 use length-1 information, and the SUR, Π, is the same as in Example 13 in Part 1; and the player 1 uses length-2 information; and the SUR for t = 1 it is Π, for t > 1 the SUR for player 1 is as follows: using Π to get x j * (t) (t) and x j * (t−1) (t). Then we assume x 1 (t + 1) = x j * (t) (t), P r = 0.8, x j * (t−1) (t), P r = 0.2.
Then the strategy dynamics for players 2, 3, 4, 5, 6 are the same as in Example 12 of Part 1. The strategy dynamics for player 1 is
x 1 (t + 1) = f1(x5(t),x6(t),x1(t),x2(t),x3(t)), P r = 0.8 f1(z4(t),z5(t),z1(t),z2(t),z3(t)),
, M f is the same as in Example 13 in Part 1. Denoted by
, where
As for the initial value, we have
with (x 1 (0), x 2 (0), x 3 (0), x 4 (0), x 5 (0), x 6 (0)) are free values, and Then, after 18 times iterations L converges to the following matrix δ 2048 [1, 2048, 2048, . . . , 2048] . According to this matrix (the whole set of data is omitted), we splite ∆ 2048 into three subsets: 
Else where x 0 ∈ D 3 , then x(t)δ 2048 2048 as t → ∞. Note that not all x ∈ ∆ 2048 can be chosen as the initial value, because the initial value should satisfy (30)-(31).
NEG WITH MULTI-SPECIES
Definition 10. An NEG is said to have s species, if there is a partition
To avoid the notational complexity, we assume s = 2. We call these two kinds of players (nodes) white (W ) and black (B) respectively. Then there are three different NEGs: G w , G b , and G m . It is reasonable to assume that G w and G b , which are the games between two white and two black players respectively, are symmetric, and G m , which is the game between a white and a black players, is asymmetric. Assume in all the three games there are k strategies for each player. Then each player has k ×k possible strategies, denoted by z i (t) = x i (t) y i (t), where x i is the strategy against white neighbors and y i is the strategy against black neighbors. We give an example to depict this. Example 11. A game with its graph depicted in Fig. 1 , where 4 nodes are white and 2 others are black. Assume k = 2 and the payoff bi-matrices for three FNGs are described by (i) G w is S-2 with parameters as (Snowdrift Game) R = −1; S = −1; T = 2; P = 0; (ii) G b is S-2 with parameters as (Hawk-Dove Game) R = −1; S = 2; T = 0; P = 1; (iii) G m is A-2 with parameters as A = 2, B = 1, C = 0, D = 0, E = 0, F = 0, G = 1, H = 2. We can calculate f i as in Tables 1-4 .
Using SUR UI-1, We have the NEG as 
(1/2,1/2) (1/2,1/2) (1/3,2/3) (1/2,1/2) (1/3,2/3) (1/3,2/3) (1/4,3/4) (1/3,2/3) f5 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 where L = δ 64 [1, 4, 4, 2, 1, 4, 4, 2, 1, 4, 4, 2, 1, 4, 32, 32, 15, 16, 16, 16, 15, 16, 16, 16, 15, 16, 16, 16, 15, 16, 16, 16, 1, 2, 2, 2, 1, 4, 2, 2, 1, 4, 2, 2, 1, 4, 20, 2, 63, 64, 64, 64, 63, 64, 64, 64, 63, 64, 64, 64, 63, 64, 64, 64] .
This NEG has two fixed points (1, 1, 1, 1, 1, 1) and (2, 2, 2, 2, 2, 2). Besides, it has two cycles with length 2, i.e., (2, 2, 2, 2, 2, 1) → (2, 2, 2, 2, 1, 1) → (2, 2, 2, 2, 2, 1) and (2, 2, 1, 1, 1, 1) → (2, 1, 1, 1, 1, 1) → (2, 2, 1, 1, 1, 1).
NEG WITH TIME-VARYING PAYOFFS
Definition 12. An NEG is said to have varying payoffs, if the parameters in the payoff bi-matrix of the NEG are time-varying. Example 13. Recall Example 12 of Part 1, where network graph is Fig. 1 (a) and the SUR is UI-1. As for the FNG, we let the non-zero parameters be flexible, that is: FNG is S-2 with constrains: R = S, P = 0 (the generalized game of Snowdrift).
Similar to Example 12 of Part 1, the FEE can be determined via Table 5 . The parameters in Table 5 are as follows: 
